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Abstract
An agent’s actions can be influenced by external factors
through the inputs it receives from the environment, as well
as internal factors, such as memories or intrinsic preferences.
The extent to which an agent’s actions are “caused from
within”, as opposed to being externally driven, should de-
pend on its sensor capacity as well as environmental demands
for memory and context-dependent behavior. Here, we test
this hypothesis using simulated agents (“animats”), equipped
with small adaptive Markov Brains (MB) that evolve to solve
a perceptual-categorization task under conditions varied with
regards to the agents’ sensor capacity and task difficulty. Us-
ing a novel formalism developed to identify and quantify the
actual causes of occurrences (“what caused what?”) in com-
plex networks, we evaluate the direct causes of the animats’
actions. In addition, we extend this framework to trace the
causal chain (“causes of causes”) leading to an animat’s ac-
tions back in time, and compare the obtained spatio-temporal
causal history across task conditions. We found that measures
quantifying the extent to which an animat’s actions are caused
by internal factors (as opposed to being driven by the environ-
ment through its sensors) varied consistently with defining
aspects of the task conditions they evolved to thrive in.
Introduction
By definition, agents are open systems that can dynamically
and informationally interact with their environments through
sensors and actuators. However, identifying which particu-
lar set of events within or outside the agent caused it to act in
a certain way is not straightforward, even if its internal struc-
ture and dynamics can be assessed in detail. This is demon-
strated particularly well by the problem of accountability we
currently face with respect to artificial intelligence (Doshi-
Velez et al., 2017). While we can, in principle, record all
network parameters of a (deep) neural network, such as Al-
phaGo (Silver et al., 2016), we still lack a principled set of
tools to understand why the network performed a particular
action (Metz, 2016).
Here, we address this issue using artificial agents (“ani-
mats”) controlled by Markov Brains (MBs) (Hintze et al.,
2017) as a model system of evolved agents, to which we ap-
ply a novel formalism for analyzing actual causation (AC)
(“what caused what”) in complex networks of interacting el-
ements (Albantakis et al., 2019). Although there is no single
widely accepted account of (actual) causation (Illari et al.,
2011; Halpern, 2016), the AC framework presented by Al-
bantakis et al. (2019) was specifically developed to identify
and quantify the strength of the direct causes of any occur-
rence (subset of network nodes in a particular state at a par-
ticular time) within such systems. Notably, this formalism
not only considers causes of single-variable occurrences, but
also evaluates multivariate causal dependencies.
Given an appropriate model system of behaving agents,
the AC framework may serve as a tool for assessing the ac-
tual causes of an agent’s actions, by characterizing the ac-
tual causes of its motor actuators. For this purpose, animats
controlled by MBs are particularly suited: MBs are a class
of evolvable neural networks that receive sensor inputs and
control motor outputs, and can be made small enough to al-
low for a complete causal and informational analysis, while
remaining capable of evolving relatively complex behaviors
(Edlund et al., 2011; Albantakis et al., 2014). As MBs may
exhibit sparse, recurrent connectivity between their nodes
(“neurons”), they resemble biological neural networks more
closely than conventional machine-learning systems.
In this study, we demonstrate how the AC analysis can
be utilized to evaluate the extent to which an animat’s ac-
tions are “intrinsic” (caused by internal occurrences) rather
than “extrinsic” (caused by sensor inputs, which are driven
by the environment). To that end, we evolved animats to
solve a perceptual-categorization task (Beer, 2003; Alban-
takis et al., 2014) under three task conditions with varying
demands for memory and context-dependent behavior. As
shown by Albantakis et al. (2014), animats evolved in more
complex environments relative to their sensor capacity de-
velop MBs with more densely connected nodes, more inter-
nal mechanisms, and higher integrated information, indicat-
Figure 1: Overview of the task environment, the animat, and analyses used in this study. (A) An animat’s Markov Brain
with connections between sensors (red), motors (blue), and hidden nodes (green). Thick borders around nodes C and D indicate
self connections. (B) Visualization of the simulated world with the animat at the bottom. (C) Time series of the animat’s brain
state during the trial. Black indicates that a node is ‘on’ (‘1’), white means ‘off’ (‘0’). The red frames highlight the two brain
states (t = 15 and t = 32) whose direct causes and causal chains are shown in (D, E). (D) Direct causes of motor states in
two example transitions. Dark color shades indicate that a node is ‘on’ (‘1’), lighter shades mean ‘off’ (‘0’). Listed below each
transition are the direct actual causes (with corresponding causal strengths α) for the states of M1, M2, and (M1,M2), together
with the characteristic quantities used in the statistical analysis. (E) The causal chains obtained by tracing the actual causes of
the motor state (M1,M2) = 01 (“move right”) back in time for 15 time steps, starting at time t = 15 (left) and t = 32 (right).
Each row in the pattern shows the summed causal strength (α, indicated by color) that each node contributes to the direct causes
of the previous time step. Listed below are the summary measures used to characterize the causal chains.
ing higher intrinsic causal complexity (Oizumi et al., 2014).
Here, we exhaustively quantify the direct actual causes of
the animats’ actions, and expand the AC framework in order
to trace back the causal chain (“causes of causes”) leading
up to a given action. In line with Albantakis et al. (2014), we
hypothesize that the causal contribution of internal nodes to
an animat’s actions and its preceeding causal chain will be
higher in animats evolved in more complex task conditions.
Moreover, we expect that the causal chain will reflect task-
specific demands for memory.
Methods
To test our hypotheses, we utilize and extend a formal frame-
work of actual causation to assess and trace back the causes
of an agent’s actions and apply it to artificial organisms (“an-
imats”) evolved in silico under several task conditions.
The artificial evolution experiments were conducted using
the open source software package MABE (Modular Agent
Based Evolver) (Bohm et al., 2017; Hintze et al., 2017).
Software to identify and quantify direct actual causes is
available as part of the PyPhi integrated information toolbox
(Mayner et al., 2018). Finally, newly developed scripts that
iteratively evaluate the actual causes of previously identified
causes are available on GitHub (Comolatti and Juel, 2019).
Data generation: Animat evolution and simulation
Evolution simulations were initialized using MABE’s stan-
dard parameter settings with further agent and environment
specifications described below. The agent types and task en-
vironments investigated in this study were adopted from Al-
bantakis et al. (2014).
Task environment. Animats were evolved in the ‘Com-
plexiPhi’ world, a 35x16 unit grid with periodic boundary
conditions, in which the animat has to move left or right to
catch or avoid falling blocks of specific sizes (Figure 1A).
Across trials, an animat (3 units wide) is placed at all posi-
tions along the bottom of the world, while blocks (one per
trial) are positioned in the top left corner, falling to the left
or right. The block is ‘caught’ if it overlaps with the animat
when it reaches the bottom, otherwise it is ‘avoided’.
Markov Brains (MBs). Animats are equipped with MBs.
Each MB consists of up to 8 binary nodes: up to 2 sen-
sors (S1 and S2), 2 motors (M1 and M2), and 4 hidden
nodes (A, B, C, and D), whose function and connectivity
is specified by hidden markov gates encoded in the animat’s
genome, as described in (Hintze et al., 2017). The global
update function of the resulting neural network can be de-
scribed by a state transition probability matrix (TPM). The
TPM specifies the probability of an animat’s MB transition-
ing between any two states, thus completely describing its
dynamics. Here, we specifically evolved animats with deter-
ministic TPMs. Nevertheless, the causal analysis described
below can be applied to probabilistic systems as long as they
fulfill the causal Markov condition (Janzing et al., 2013; Al-
bantakis et al., 2019).
During a trial, an animat’s sensor is activated if a block
is positioned directly above it at any height, and otherwise
remains ‘off’ (‘0’). The two sensors are positioned on each
side of the animat, leaving a gap of 1 unit between them.
The state of the remaining nodes updates according to the
animat’s TPM. However, motors are reset (set to ‘off’ (‘0’))
before each update, effectively excluding any feedback from
the motors to the hidden nodes or sensors. The motor state
determines the animat’s action at each time step (‘10’: move
left, ‘01’: move right, ‘00’ or ‘11’: stand still). This process
repeats until the block reaches the bottom of the world, at
which point the success of the animat is recorded before the
next trial begins.
Genetic algorithm and task fitness. Each evolution sim-
ulation is initiated with a population of 100 animats with
random circular genomes. At each new generation, this pool
of genomes is subject to fitness-based selection and muta-
tion, which allows the animats to adapt to higher fitness
across generations. An animat’s fitness, F , is determined
by its percentage of successful trials (correctly caught or
avoided blocks). After each generation the genetic algorithm
draws a new sample of 100 animats (with replacement)
based on an exponential measure of F (roulette wheel se-
lection). Before the next generation, the genome of each se-
lected animat mutates using point mutations, deletions, and
duplications (Albantakis et al., 2014; Hintze et al., 2017).
For each task condition, 50 populations of animats were ini-
tialized, and evolved independently for 30,000 generations.
Task conditions. Animats evolve under three conditions
varying in difficulty relative to their sensor capacity:
• Baseline (BL) condition: catch blocks of size 1, avoid
blocks of size 3, using 2 sensors;
• One sensor (1S) condition: catch blocks of size 1, avoid
blocks of size 3, using only 1 (the left) sensor;
• Hard task (HT) condition: catch blocks of size 1 and 4,
avoid blocks of size 2 and 3, using 2 sensors.
Thus, animats in the BL and 1S conditions perform the same
task, while animats in BL and HT conditions use the same
number of sensors. Compared to BL, in conditions 1S and
HT additional computations across multiple time steps are
necessary to distinguish which blocks have to be caught or
avoided. Nevertheless, some internal memory is necessary
in all conditions to identify whether the block is moving to
the left or right.
Data processing: Causal analysis
The Actual Causation (AC) framework. Here, we
briefly describe the relevant concepts of the AC framework
by Albantakis et al. (2019). For details and formal defini-
tions of the terminology, we refer to the original publication.
Given a transition st−1 ≺ st between two subsequent
states of a discrete dynamical system of interacting elements
S, the AC formalism allows identifying the actual causes of
occurrences at time t from the set of occurrences at time
t − 1 based on a quantitative counterfactual analysis. Here,
“occurrence” simply denotes a subset of network nodes in a
particular state (for example a motor in state ‘off’: M1 = 0).
In the AC framework, an occurrence xt−1 ⊆ st−1 may only
be a cause of another occurrence yt ⊆ st, if yt makes it
more likely that xt−1 has actually occurred. A “higher-
order” occurrence (the joint state of a set of multiple nodes)
may specify its own cause xt−1, if it raises the probability
of xt−1 more than parts of the occurrence do when sepa-
rated by a partitionΨ (Oizumi et al., 2014; Albantakis et al.,
2019). This difference in probabilities indicates the causal
strength (α) with which yt determines xt−1. In simplified
terms, α = minΨ
�
log2
p(xt−1|yt)
Ψ(p(xt−1|yt))
�
, where Ψ partitions
p(xt−1 | yt) into p(x1,t−1 | y1,t) × p(x2,t−1 | y2,t)). α
can be viewed as the irreducible information that an occur-
rence specifies about its cause. The actual cause of an occur-
rence yt is then defined as the subset x∗t−1 ⊆ st−1, for which
α(x∗t−1, yt) = αmax(yt). The set of nodes that constitutes
the actual cause (x∗t−1 ⊆ st−1) is termed the cause purview
of the occurrence in question, and the number of nodes in
the purview is a measure of how distributed the cause is.
Direct actual causes of motor states. To identify the ac-
tual causes of an animat’s action (M1 and M2 being in a
particular state), and to quantify their causal strength, we
consider transitions from all inputs to the motors (i.e., the
sensors and hidden nodes) at time t − 1 to the motors
at time t: (S1, S2,A,B,C,D)t−1 ≺ (M1,M2)t. For a
given state of the motors (M1,M2)t, there can be a max-
imum of three distinct actual causes among all subsets of
(S1, S2,A,B,C,D)t−1: one for the state of M1, one for the
state of M2, and one for the “higher-order” state (M1,M2)t
(if (M1,M2)t is irreducible to its partition into M1 and M2).
As an example, consider the animat transition shown in
Figure 1D from t = 14 to t = 15. Here, (S2,D)14 = (1, 1)
is the actual cause of M115 = 0 with α = 1.415 bit.
(S2,B,C)14 = (1, 0, 0) is the actual cause of M215 = 1with
causal strength α = 0.415 bit. In addition, (M1,M2)15 =
(0, 1) also has its own actual cause (S2,B,C)14 = (1, 0, 0)
with α = 0.415 bit. This means that (M1,M2)15 = (0, 1)
specifies an additional 0.415 bit of information about the
state of (S2,B,C) at t = 14 compared to M115 = 0 and
M215 = 1 taken individually. Also, note that the cause
purviews of the three occurrences contain different sets of
Figure 2: Fitness, structural, and functional properties of animats. (A1) Fitness of animats (with final fitness distributions in
(A2)), quantified as the ratio of successful trials. (B) #connected nodes measures the number of hidden nodes with incoming and
outgoing connections (maximally 4, A-D). (C) #Unique transitions across all trials within a generation estimates the dynamical
complexity of the animats. (D)-(G) Density of connections between different node types quantified as the number of connections
between the nodes divided by the total possible number of such connections. The lines show the bootstrap resampled means
for the population (the shaded area indicates the 95% CI of the mean). Statistically significant difference between conditions
are indicated by the colored bars (and stars). The legend in (A) indicates the coloring for all panels.
nodes. For example, hidden node B is part of the actual
cause of M2 in this transition, but is not in the cause purview
of M115 = 0. Moreover, there is no need for a node to be
‘on’ (‘1’) to be part of the cause of an occurrence. Finally,
S1, for example, is not part of any actual cause even though
it has a direct connection to both M1 and M2. In other
words, S114 = 0 does not contribute to “bringing about”
the state of the motors at t = 15 in this particular transition.
However, in the transition from t = 31 to t = 32, S131 = 0
does contribute to the causes of (M1,M2)32.
Thus, for every animat, we find the direct actual causes
of the motor state in every unique transition and calculate
several measures to quantify the degree to which the motor
state was caused from within (see legend of Figure 3).
Quantifying the causal chain: the backtracking analysis.
We also perform a ‘backtracking analysis’ of the causes of
the motor states, for all transitions in a trial past t = 15
(Figure 1E). This analysis amounts to identifying and char-
acterizing the chain of causes leading up to an action.
Having quantified the direct actual causes of a transition
xt−1 ≺ yt (where xt−1 is the state of the sensors and hidden
nodes at time t − 1 and yt is the state of the motors at time
t), we define a joint purview zt−1 ⊆ xt−1 as the union of
all identified cause purviews. In other words, zt−1 is the
state at time t − 1 of all elements contributing to the actual
causes of the motor occurrences, M1t, M2t, and (M1,M2)t.
In the example shown in Figure 1D (top), this corresponds
to z14 = {(S2,B,C,D)14 = (0, 1, 0, 1)}.
Iteratively, we then proceeded to identify and quantify the
actual causes for the transitions xt−2 ≺ zt−1, xt−3 ≺ zt−2,
etc., thus tracing back the causal chain of the observed mo-
tor state at time t. This process is repeated until all cause
purviews in the causal account contain only sensors (indicat-
ing that the cause is completely “extrinsic”) or upon reach-
ing t− 15 (to make results comparable across time steps).
For every animat, we find the causal chain leading to each
motor state (after t = 15) and calculate several measures
aimed to quantify the “intrinsicality” of the backtracking
pattern (see legend of Figure 4).
Statistics
Throughout this work, we use bootstrap resampling to esti-
mate means and to calculate 95% confidence intervals be-
tween the 2.5th and the 97.5th percentile of the resampled
distribution (CI95% = [P2.5%, P97.5%]). Although data
samples generating overlapping confidence intervals may
still differ significantly, we take non-overlapping confidence
intervals as an indicator of a statistically significant differ-
ence between conditions.
Results
Our simulated evolution experiments under three task con-
ditions reproduce earlier findings reported in (Albantakis
et al., 2014). Average fitness is higher in the baseline (BL)
condition, than in both the one-sensor (1S) and the hard-task
Figure 3: Analysis of direct causes for actions as a function of generation in different task conditions. (A) Total causal
strength: summed α across the identified direct causes of M1, M2, and (M1,M2). (B) Sensor causal strength: summed α
of the sensor portion in the cause purviews. (C) Hidden causal strength: summed α of the hidden node portion in the cause
purviews. (D) Hidden ratio: the ratio of hidden and total causal strength per purview. (B-D) To compute the sensor and hidden
portion of the causal strength, we simply multiplied the fraction of sensor and hidden nodes in each actual cause purview by its
α value. We did not recompute α values for sensor or hidden node subsets, as these subsets do not correspond to actual causes
themselves. (E) Total number of nodes in the cause purviews. All measures are averaged across the unique transitions across
times and trials for each animat. Mean, 95% CI, and statistical significance are as in Figure 2.
(HT) conditions (Figure 2A). In addition, the fitness among
animats in the HT condition is significantly higher than in
the 1S condition, indicating a hierarchy of overall difficulty
among the three conditions: BL<HT< 1S. Since fewer an-
imats achieved a final fitness of at least 80% by generation
30,000 for the 1S than the BL and HT conditions (11/50 for
1S vs 49/50 and 48/50 for BL and HT), we use the subset
with fitness> 80% as the default population in condition 1S
(representing successful evolution), unless otherwise stated.
Structural and dynamic analysis of animats
Generally, measures of the structural and dynamical com-
plexity of the animats increase with fitness throughout evo-
lution (Figure 2; the only exception is a decrease in connec-
tions from sensors to motors for 1S and BL in panel F).
In terms of the dynamical complexity exhibited by the an-
imats, those evolved in the HT condition show the largest
repertoire of unique state transitions (Figure 2C). Although
the number of potential state transitions is smaller in condi-
tion 1S due to the reduced number of available nodes (7 vs.
8), the fittest 1S animats still compare to the BL condition.
Structurally, differences from the BL condition are most
pronounced in the number of connected nodes (Figure 2B)
and the density of connections to the hidden nodes (Fig-
ure 2D,E). In particular, the density of connections between
hidden nodes reflects the hierarchy of task difficulty. On
the other hand, differences in connections to the motors are
smaller (Figure 2D,G).
Actual Causation analysis: direct causes of actions
To characterize the causes of the animats’ actions across the
three task conditions, we first analyzed the direct causes of
their motor states for all unique transitions per animat. Here,
only nodes directly connected to the motors may appear in
the actual cause purviews of a motor occurrence (see Fig-
ure 2D,G). However, whether any particular input node con-
tributes to the cause purviews may vary depending on the
transition (see Figure 1D). Nevertheless, as shown in Figure
3, the differences in direct motor causes between conditions
do not simply follow the pattern observed for the structural
and dynamical analysis (Figure 2).
Animats in the HT condition show a lower total and hid-
den causal strength (Figure 3A and C), but a higher num-
ber of nodes in the cause purviews (Figure 3E) than animats
from the BL condition. The 1S condition exhibits lower sen-
sor causal strength, but higher hidden causal strength than
conditions BL and HT, and correspondingly, also a signifi-
cantly higher hidden ratio (Figure 3C-E). Furthermore, the
number of purview nodes is significantly lower in the 1S
condition than in BL and HT (Figure 3E).
Thus, although there are no clear differences in the den-
sity of connections to motors between the conditions, the
direct cause analysis seems to distinguish the more difficult
conditions from the BL condition by the number of nodes
in the purview and the way the causal strength is distributed
among different types of nodes, albeit in opposite directions.
Actual Causation analysis: Backtracking analysis.
Next, we investigated whether considering the causal chain
(“causes of causes”) leading to an animat’s action yields ad-
ditional information about the causal structure of the animat
and the causes of its actions. Here, every node with a di-
rected path towards a motor may contribute to the causal
chain given sufficient backsteps.
In contrast to the direct cause analysis, in the backtracking
analysis both the 1S and HT conditions differ significantly
Figure 4: Results of backtracking analysis from animats in the last generation. (A) Total causal strength: summed α across
the backtracking pattern. (B) Sensor causal strength: summed α of the sensor portion in the backtracking pattern. (C) Hidden
causal strength: summed α of the hidden node portion in the backtracking pattern. (D) Hidden ratio: the ratio of hidden and
total causal strength. (E) Complexity of the causal chain: number of unique rows in a backtracking pattern. (F) ‘Duration’
measures the average length of the causal chain by calculating the area of the backtracking pattern and normalizing by the
max number of sensor and hidden nodes in the animat (6 for the BL and HT conditions and 5 for the 1S condition). Each dot
corresponds to the value for one animat (averaged over times and trials) in the last generation of the evolution. Colors are as in
previous figures, with the dark blue dots marking animats from the 1S condition with fitness above 0.8. Shaded patches indicate
95% confidence intervals. Statistically significant differences between populations are indicated by the colored bars (and stars).
from BL in a consistent manner on several measures. First
of all, the total, sensor, and hidden causal strengths (Figure
4A-C) of the backtracking patterns are all higher (for the
fittest animats) in 1S and HT than in BL. However, only the
1S condition has a higher hidden ratio than BL (Figure 4D),
as in the direct cause analysis (Figure 3D). Thus, animats
in the HT condition seem to require more involvement from
both sensors and hidden nodes than the BL condition to suc-
cessfully complete their task. On the other hand, animats in
the 1S condition seem to compensate their missing sensor
by relying more on hidden nodes, resulting in a higher hid-
den ratio compared to the BL condition. In addition, both
the complexity (Figure 4E) and duration (Figure 4F) of the
backtracking patterns were higher in the 1S and HT condi-
tions than in the BL condition, reflecting the higher memory
requirements in these two conditions.
Finally, the systematic effect of including only the fittest
animats from the 1S condition was apparent across all eval-
uated characteristics of the backtracking patterns, and the
hierarchy of task difficulty across the three conditions (BL
< HT < 1S) observed in the structural analysis (Figure 2)
reemerged for the backtracking analysis.
Discussion
In this paper we applied measures of structural and dynam-
ical complexity, as well as a novel actual causation (AC)
framework (Albantakis et al., 2019), to characterize the ac-
tions of simulated agents that evolved to solve perceptual-
categorization tasks. With the structural and dynamical anal-
ysis, we confirmed findings from previous studies indicating
that more demanding task conditions lead to the evolution
of animats with more interconnected ‘brains’ with a higher
capacity for computations and memory (Albantakis et al.,
2014). Using the AC framework, we identified and quanti-
fied the direct causes of the animat’s actions as well as their
preceeding causal chains. To assess the degree to which an
animat’s actions were “caused from within” (as opposed to
being externally driven through its sensors), we moreover
quantified the relative contribution of its hidden and sensor
nodes to the cause purviews and backtracking pattern of its
motor states.
As discussed in more detail below, we found that the
different types of analyses revealed different aspects about
the animats’ causal structure and the task conditions under
which they evolved. While some measures reflected the hi-
erarchy of task difficulty across the three conditions (BL <
HT < 1S), the direct actual causes in particular highlighted
differences between 1S and HT.
As hypothesized, the causal chains leading to actions in
animats evolved in difficult conditions (hard tasks relative
to sensor capacities) with higher demands for internal mem-
ory were characterized by higher total causal strength, and
reverberated longer within the animat itself than in animats
evolved in the simpler baseline condition.
In all, our results suggested that the “intrinsicality” of the
direct causes and the causal chain preceding an agent’s ac-
tions may serve as a useful indicator of its intrinsic com-
plexity and degree of causal autonomy (see also Marshall
et al. (2017); Bertschinger et al. (2008)), while the num-
ber of nodes constituting the cause purviews, as well as the
complexity and duration of the causal chains may reflect its
context-sensitivity.
Differences between conditions
Both the 1S and HT conditions require more internal mem-
ory to distinguish which blocks have to be caught or avoided
compared to the BL condition. This task property is re-
flected in the higher number of connected nodes (Figure 2B)
and the measures assessed in the backtracking analysis (Fig-
ure 4), and also underlies the observed hierarchy in task dif-
ficulty (Figure 2A).
However, in the HT condition, more blocks need to be
classified than in BL and 1S. Nevertheless, the animats can
only make use of the same repertoire of possible actions.
Which action is chosen is thus more context-dependent in
condition HT than in the other two conditions. The higher
context-dependency of condition HT may explain the op-
posing results between HT and 1S in the direct causes of
the animats’ actions (Figure 3): the direct cause purviews
in the HT condition are larger and more distributed across
sensors and hidden nodes, leading to a similar hidden ratio
as BL. In contrast, animats in the 1S condition have a higher
hidden ratio due to increased memory requirements, but less
distributed computation. In sum, our results suggest that the
backtracking analysis measures are mostly affected by as-
pects related to memory requirements, while the direct cause
analysis capture context-sensitivity and distributed compu-
tation.
Causal analysis
Given that the results of the causal analysis, at least in part,
reflect differences in the structural and dynamical properties
of the animats, the advantages of a computationally demand-
ing causal analysis may not be immediately clear. For exam-
ple, one could argue that observed differences between con-
ditions in the causal analysis might be explained by struc-
tural properties of the animat populations (such as the longer
causal chains with higher hidden causal strength being ex-
plained by more, and more densely interconnected, nodes).
However, there are at least two reasons for applying the AC
analysis in addition to more standard approaches.
First, the AC analysis specifically takes an animat’s mech-
anistic, counterfactual structure into account (see also Shal-
izi et al. (2005)). Therefore, it may describe aspects of the
system that cannot be captured by purely structural, or dy-
namical, informational, or correlational measures based on
observed data only (Marshall et al., 2017). For example, we
hardly found significant differences between task conditions
regarding the inputs to the motor nodes (Figure 2F,G). Yet,
the sensor and hidden causal strength varied significantly
across conditions (Figure 3B,C and Figure 4B,C).
Secondly, the AC analysis is applied to each individual
transition independently and can identify the causes and in-
trinsicality of each specific action (motor state), giving a
state-dependent description of the animat behavior (see also
Lizier et al. (2014) and Beer and Williams (2014)). As can
be seen from the example in Figure 1, the same action be-
ing performed by the same animat at two different times
may have distinct causes depending on the past states of the
rest of the animat. Correlations between an agent’s struc-
tural/dynamical properties and the results of the causal anal-
ysis may thus only become apparent when averaging across
many transitions as done here. In future work, it could be
investigated how the actual causes of an animat’s actions
change on a trial-by-trial basis, for specific block sizes, the
direction of motion, or whether a block should be caught or
avoided. State-independent measures that characterize the
animat as a whole cannot assess such questions, but may
still serve as useful indicators for a system’s capacity for in-
ternally caused motor states.
Of course, alternative formalisms for measuring actual
causes and causal chains exist (e.g. Datta et al. (2016);
Weslake (2015)), which might also be applicable to artifi-
cial agents. Nevertheless, the AC framework used here was
specifically developed for discrete dynamical systems of in-
teracting elements, such as Markov Brains, which makes
it particularly suited for the present study. An interesting
question is under which circumstances causal measures ef-
fectively exceed dynamical or information-theoretical ap-
proaches in elucidating an agent’s behavior (e.g., Beer and
Williams (2014); Lizier et al. (2014)).
Finally, we did not directly consider issues regarding
causal transitivity in this work. The question of whether (and
when) the “causes of causes” of an occurrence are them-
selves causes, is still highly debated. To answer such ques-
tions, our proposed approached must be further refined and
adjusted accordingly.
Towards a principled definition of agency
On a more philosophical note, the definition of terms used
here (such as agent and agency) should be revisited and clar-
ified in future work. For example, throughout this paper we
have been using the term agent to refer to the predefined set
of nodes that comprise the animats under investigation. And
if we define an agent loosely as some system that can sense
and interact with its environment, this may not seem prob-
lematic. However, if we aim to understand agency more fun-
damentally, we would also need a way to determine which
subset of nodes within a larger set of elements actually con-
stitutes the agent. For this we require a more stringent def-
inition of an agent, as we cannot assume that the borders of
the agent itself can always be drawn a priori.
One example of such a more stringent definition could
be that an agent is (1) an open physical system with stable,
self-defined and self-maintained causal borders, with (2) the
capacity to perform actions that causally originate within the
system itself (Albantakis, 2018) (see also Polani et al. (2016)
for an information-based alternative). In this context, it has
been shown that the same causal principles on which the ac-
tual causation framework is based (Oizumi et al., 2014) can
also be used to identify the causal borders of highly inte-
grated subsets of nodes within larger networks, indicating
that this type of causal analysis may be used to find au-
tonomous systems that fulfill the first criterion for agency
listed above (Marshall et al., 2017) (alternatively, see Fris-
ton (2013), Beer (2015), or Kolchinsky andWolpert (2018)).
In summary, we may draw upon and adhere to the theoretical
structure and mathematical formalism used in the integrated
information theory (IIT) of consciousness (Oizumi et al.,
2014) to evaluate both parts of the proposed two-fold defini-
tion of agency. Thus, it seems possible that the IIT and AC
formalism, taken together, may be used to relate concepts
of agency, autonomy, causality, and consciousness within a
self-consistent and principled theoretical framework.
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